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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
-AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the two day suspension
of Michael Edmondson? If not what shall be the
rememdy?
A hearing was held on June 24, 1988 at which time Mr.
Edmondson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

I am not persuaded that the accident which triggered the
grievant's suspension was "chargeable" to him.

It is conceded

that after the accident, an inspection of his bus disclosed the
bus brakes to be "long."
It is a reasonable and logical conclusion that when confronted with the need to stop quickly, the brakes did not hold
as well as they would have had they been in proper condition.
I do not conclude that the collision would or could have been
avoided regardless of the condition of the brakes. There is no
evidentiary support to the Company's contention that the grievant
was

traveling too fast or that the circumstances leading to the

accident did not confront the grievant suddenly, without his fault,
requiring an emergency use of the brakes.

I find therefore,

based on the probative evidence before me, that the proximate
cause of the accident was probably the "long" brakes, and not the
grievant's negligence.
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It is only speculation to argue that the grievant should
have known of or experienced the "long" brakes during the earlier
part of his run and therefore should have returned the bus to the
garage or driven it with extra care.

There is no evidence that

his run prior to the accident was anything but normal and routine,
or that any event took place which required the use of the brakes
in any but a normal or routine manner.

Under those normal cir-

cumstances, the long brakes were adequate for routine stops.
There is no evidence that any other circumstance before the
accident required the heavy use of the brakes comparable to the
situation at the time of the accident.
In short, the Company has not shown by the requisite clear
and convincing evidence, that the accident is chargeable to the
grievant.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the two day suspension of Michael Edmondson. The suspension
is reversed and shall be removed from his record.
He shall be made whole for the time lost.

DATED: August 4, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
John Knight? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 14, 1988 at which time Mr.
Knight, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All con-

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

Each side filed a post-hearing brief.

In my Award of October 16, 1986, dealing with the grievant's
discharge at that time, I reduced his discharge to a disciplinary
suspension; I reinstated him without back pay; and I warned him
"that future relevant violations, if proved, will result in his
discharge. "
The issue in the instant case is whether the grievant
committed "future relevant violations," triggering and justifying
his discharge.
I conclude that he committed at least one "future, relevant
violation" within the meaning of my prior Award and that his instant discharge therefore was for just cause.
The record before me discloses that the grievant is charged
with going off his route on January 17, 1987; leaving his double
parked bus unattended on May 4th; thereafter not notifying the
Employer within the required time of having twice received moving
violations; reporting to work late on June 9, 1987 and August 3
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1987; driving erratically and unsafely in August 1987; and November
16, 1987 parking his bus in front of a fire hydrant, and leaving
it unattended while he had lunch in a nearby diner.
I find no need to rule on any but the last charge.

There

is clear and convincing evidence including the grievant's admission, that he parked his bus in front of a fire hydrant while
he lunched in a nearby diner.

The grievant parked it there for

some forty minutes, and didn't even respond or see the bus's
removal from that location, and return to the garage, by a spare
driver at the Employer's direction
The grievant violated motor vehicle regulations and by
consequence, Employer operating rules.

Standing alone, this may

not be a dischargeable offense, but when viewed against the backdrop of the final warning I gave him only a year before, it constitutes a"triggering event" and a future relevant offense,
constituting cause for the grievant's termination.

Considering

the opportunity I gave him a year ago, and the final warning then
imposed, the grievant had a special duty to work in compliance
with all rules and regulations and
tions.

He failed to meet this duty.

to scrupulously avoid violaTo wilfully violate a well

known motor vehicle regulation, as the grievant did when he parked
his bus in front of a hydrant, and left it while he went to lunch,
is to knowingly disregard the final warning and to default on his
final chance.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
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There was just cause for the discharge
of John Knight.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 24, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss' :
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America
AWARD
and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Fernando Gonzales? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 14, 1988 at which time Mr.
Gonzales, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for "falsification of his
employment application."

The record establishes that in applying

for a bus operator job with the Employer, the grievant did not
include prior employment from October 19, 1979 to December 16,
1983 as a bus driver with Liberty Lines.
Employer on November 5, 1985.

He was hired by the

During the hearing it became clear

and undisputed that the grievant left Liberty Lines because of his
misconduct

there and did not disclose it in his application to

the Employer for fear that he would not have been hired.

It also

became clear that the nature of his misconduct at Liberty Lines,
if disclosed or uncovered, would have caused the Employer to
reject his application.

It is undisputed that the Employer has

a duty "to perform an investigation of the driver's employment
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record during the preceeding three years.

That the grievant and

Liberty Lines may have reached a termination arrangement whereby
the grievant would get a satisfactory reference, is immaterial
to his willful failure to disclose that previous employment.

Also

immaterial is the fact that the Employer only recently learned of
this omission.
Under the circumstances, it is obvious that the grievant ' s omission of that prior employment was a material omission
and a material falsification.
The Employer's employment application, and the application
for the Board of Education

(which the grievant also filled out

for his employment with the Employer and on which he also omitted
his prior service with Liberty Lines) contain the following respective statements immediately above the grievant's signature:
"It is agreed and understood that any misrepresentation of information given above
shall be considered an act of dishonesty,
and cause for dismissal."
"To the best of my knowledge and belief the
answers to the above questions are true."
The grievant's omission of his work with Liberty Lines
is violative of those two statements, and, under the particular
circumstances thereof, constitute cause for discharge.
Accordingly, the grievant's discharge is sustained.
However, I think this case warrants a recommendation from
the Impartial Chairman.

My recommendation, which of course is not

binding and does not change my Award, is that the Employer and the
Union give serious consideration to a joint agreement which would
permit the grievant to return to work with the Employer.
I believe the grievant is contrite about his earlier misconduct and recognizes the serious mistakes he made.

He has tried
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to rehabilitate himself by tangible effort to rectify his earlier
misconduct and by rendering satisfactory service to the Employer
for over two years.

Apparently he has tried to put his mistakes

behind him and has shown a determination to be a good and productive employee with the Employer.

He seeks a chance at re-

demption and to "have a life of employment."

His discharge,

though justified, and basically because of his earlier misconduct
may well dash those hopes irrevocably.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and Employer
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
Fernando Gonzales.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: January 21, 1988
STATE OF New York )Q C
COUNTY OF New York ) I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION AND AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Antoine Farmer? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on May 10 and June 24, 1988 at which time
Mr. Farmer, Herinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived. Post-hearing briefs were filed.
The grievant was discharged for having three chargeable
accidents, within the approximately two years of his employment.
The first and third accidents, on December 15, 1986 and
January 25, 1988, though minor, are not disputed by the Union
with regard to the grievant's chargeability.

The most serious

accident in which the grievant was involved and the center of
this dispute,

was the second at West Point on July 18, 1987,

when the mirror of his bus struck a guard booth, and during
which a military guard was fatally injured.
The Union asserts that the Employer really discharged the
grievant based on its claim that the grievant "killed the guard."

The Union contends that this is an improper charge and not a
chargeable aspect to the West Point accident because it has not
been determined that the grievant's bus struck the guard or that
the grievant has any culpability for the guard's injury and
subsequent death.

As the matter is still subject to

investigation and litigation, the Union argues, the grievant's
responsibility or lack of responsibility for that event connected
with the accident, remains undetermined, and cannot be used by
the Employer as a basis for his discharge.
My study of the record supports the Union's contention.

I

am persuaded that the Employer concluded that the grievant was
responsible for the guard's death, and used that conclusion in
deciding to discharge him.

I find that but for that belief it is

unlikely that the grievant would have been discharged.

I so

conclude because during this arbitration hearing, the Employer's
position changed.

At the outset it charged the grievant with

three chargeable accidents, one of which "resulted in a fatality
to a West Point guard."

Also, there is evidence that at

grievance meetings, the Employer expressed the view that the
grievant was responsible for the fatality.

Later in the hearing

and in its summation, the Employer took the position that the
guard's death had nothing to do with the decision to discharge
the grievant.

And that all that it considered in the West Point

accident was the contact between the grievant's moving bus and
the guard booth.
This is not to say that the three accidents as relied on by
the Employer in its final position would not have been grounds

for the grievant's termination, especially in view of the
findings of the Department of Transportation that the grievant
drove at an excessive speed.

But rather, considering the changes

in the Employer's arbitral position regarding the West Point
accident.

I believe that the ultimate penalty of discharge

included as an important ingredient, the Employer's original
view, namely that the grievant was responsible for the guard's
death.
Therefore, it is not a question of whether the three
accidents were chargeable to the grievant without consideration
of the West Point fatality, but what factors the Employer took
into consideration in deciding on the penalty of discharge.

If

an important element considered has not been established, the
discharge cannot stand as a result of this arbitration, even if
it might have been sustained on a different basis.
Factually, the cause of the guard's death has not yet been
determined.

Apparently, from the DOT report, he was not in the

guard booth when it was struck by the bus.
and litigation remain.

Further investigation

That being so, the Employer's original

reliance on the fatality as a key basis in the grievant's
discharge was premature if not erroneous.
Yet, I cannot ignore the proven fact that the grievant has
three chargeable accidents (without consideration of the West
Point fatality) within the approximately two years of his
employment.
Also, and of essential importance is the public safety.
Frankly, if the grievant was responsible for the fatality, he

should not be driving a bus carrying public passengers.

Indeed,

again in consideration of the public welfare, until the question
of his responsibility is established one way or the other, the
necessary prudent step is that he not be re-assigned to driving
or to an operating job.

Yet, because the Company mis-relied,

prematurely or erroneously on the fatality the discharge at this
point cannot stand.

Under these particular circumstances, I

shall fashion a remedy which I have previously utilized under
this contract, and which, I believe properly reflects the present
status of the facts and evidence in this case.
The Undersigned, impartial chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proof and allergations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of Antoine Farmer is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension for the period he has been out.
He shall be returned to the Company's employ, without
back pay in a non-driving, non-operating job, at the
rate of pay of any such job. When the issue of
liability or culpability for the fatality at West Point
is determined, the parties shall have the right to
petition me for further action.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:
September 6, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)ss
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION AND AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
What are the obligations of the Employer to
make payment of life insurance benefits to
the husband and children of Betty Gilchrist
under
Paragraph
26
of
the
Collective
Bargaining Agreement ?
Betty Gilchrist, a bus operator employed by New York
Bus Service died on July 26, 1988.

Pursuant to Paragraph 26 of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement the Employer is required to
provide $10,000 of life insurance for each of its employees.
There is no dispute

that Mrs. Gilchrist was covered

by such

policy and her legally designated beneficiaries are entitled to
receive the proceeds thereof.
The
signed

by

November
children."
benefits.

beneficiary

Mrs.
7,
as
Mrs.

Gilchrist
1986
the

designation
and

designated

submitted
"John

beneficiaries

Gilchrist was

card

of

survived

to

for
the

such

Employer

Gilchrist,
the
by

life
her

policy
on

husband,
insurance

husband

John

Gilchrist and the following children whose respective dates of
birth are listed hereinbelow.
Annette Jamison
Lynette Jamison
John Gilchrist, Jr.
Jacqueline Gilchrist
Jennifer Gilchrist
Stephen
his

children,

deceased

April 8, 1970
April 8, 1970
October 10, 1975
May 16, 1980
May 16, 1980

N. Erlitz, counsel

has

represented

the

proceeds

that

for Mr. John Gilchrist and

that

of the

it was
life

equally in six shares among her husband

the

intent

insurance

of the

be divided

and children.

Neither

the Employer nor the Union are aware of any facts evidencing a
contrary
has

intent

noted

Gilchrist
unable

on the part of Betty Gilchrist.

however,

that

and Jennifer

to

consent

or

John

Gilchrist
waive

Gilchrist,
are minors

rights

in

Jr.,

connection

with

the

life insurance

Because of the financial burden and time involved in

submitting
Court,

Jacqueline

and thus, legally

distribution of the proceeds of their mother's
benefits.

The Employer

this

question

for

resolution

to

the Employer, the Union and counsel

the

Surrogate's

for Mr. Gilchrist

and his children have agreed to submit this matter to me for
determination of the manner in which the proceeds of the life
insurance policy should be distributed.
Accordingly, in order to effectuate the intent of Mrs.
Gilchrist
extent
that

and to protect the interests

of all parties to the

possible at this time, it is my determination and award
the

proceeds

of

the

life
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insurance

benefits

due

Betty

Gilchrist's
John

beneficiaries

Gilchrist,

Annette

receive one share.
John

Gilchrist

remaining

three

Gilchrist,
Jamison

and

and

be divided

into

Jamison, Lynette

six

equal

Jamison

shares.

shall each

The remaining three shares shall be paid to

in

trust

for

children,
Jennifer

Lynette

the

John

benefit

Gilchrist,

Gilchrist.

Jamison

of

John

shall each

each

Jr.,

a

the

Jacqueline

Gilchrist,
as

of

Annette

condition

to

receiving the proceeds of the policy execute and deliver to the
Employer a General Release in its favor, together with a signed
and

notarized

statement

consenting

to

this

award

and

indemnifying the Employer against any claim or action which may
be brought against it in connection

with the distribution of

the proceeds of the insurance policy by or on behalf of the
infant children, John Gilchrist, Jr., Jacqueline Gilchrist and
Jennifer Gilchrist.

I shall retain jurisdiction over this matter, in the
event

any

question

arises

in the

future with

regard to the

interpretation or implementation of this award.
Dated:

November

, 1988

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
STATE OF NEW YORK )
:
COUNTY OF
)

ss. :

I, Eric J. Schmertz, do hereby affirm upon my oath as
arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Newspaper Guild of
New York, Local 3

CONSENT

AWARD

and
New York Post

On August 4, 1988 the day of the hearing of the above matter,
the above-named parties settled the dispute by direct negotiations.
In the presence of the parties, the Undersigned Arbitrator reviewed
the terms of the settlement with the grievant, Patricia Beddoe.
Ms. Beddoe expressly agreed to and accepted said settlement.

At

the request of the parties, and with Ms. Beddoe' s agreement, said
settlement is made my AWARD as follows:
1.

Patricia Beddoe will be paid beginning
Monday, August 8, 1988 at the Group VII
B, one year experience sales; rate which
is $716.70 per week. Her anniversary
date for experience level increases in
that job is August 8th.

2.

She will receive additional compensation
by way of bonus and commissions, if any,
in accordance with The Post Sales Policy
generally applicable to sales people.

3.

She will receive in addition, a one-time,
lump sum "sign-on" bonus of $200, in a
separate check, to accompany her pay
check for the week beginning August 8,
1988.

4.

She will be entitled to automatic assignment to the first Group VII B outside
classified sales position that becomes
available, subject to the contractual
probationary period.

5.

Within two weeks of August 8, 1988 she
will be provided with a jointly agreed
to job description for the position
Sales Associate, and will assume such
duties which will entail the performance
by her of 75% of her time on present
duties and 25% of her time on outside
sales duties (on the average as to both).
It is understood that the job Sales
Associate is specially created for her
and will not survive when she vacates it
for any reason.
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Within two weeks from August 8, 1988 she
will be assigned a retail sales territory
in which she will perform that 25% portion
of her time involving outside sales. It
is understood that this sales territory
will be a representative sales territory
substantively comparable to the sales
territories of the other retail sales
people. The performance of said duties
described in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof
shall be subject to the contractual provisions with respect to the probationary
period, provided that if she does not complete the probationary period satisfactorily, she will be returned to her present
job, but shall continue to be paid at the
Group VII B rate aforementioned.
This settlement is without precedent a;
as to
any other matter and without prejudice to
the respective positions of the parties in
this arbitration.
This settlement resolves all claims arising out of this dispute including those
related to Article XX Section 1 of the
contract. The grievant, Patricia Beddoe
releases the Employer, the Union, their
officers, agents and employees of any
claim, including any claim of discrimination due to race, creed, color, sex, national origin, political belief or membership or activity in the Guild or any claim
of alleged breach of the duty of fair representation .
The Undersigned Arbitrator retains jurisdiction to decide any and all disputes
which may arise from this settlement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 9, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
and
New York Telephone

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case No. 1-87-192
N.Y. Tel. Case No. A~87-436

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the suspension of Gary Kacanich for just
cause?
A hearing was held on July 19, 1988 at which time Mr.
Kacanich, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
The determinative question is whether the grievant pressure
tested a repaired splice and if so whether he did it properly.

It

is the Company's position that if he did the assignment properly
on August 25, 1986, the splice repair, made over the period August
22 to August 25, 1986, on a cable that previously failed could not
have failed again, a few days later on September 4.
The grievant testified that he did the pressure test three
times and no defects were disclosed.

The procedure he stated he

followed, was consistent with what is required when a pressure test
is made.

There is no direct evidence to the contrary.

The Company asserts that if done properly, the pressure test
is infallible in discovering splice defects, and that therefore a
subsequent failure of that splice because of defective repairs,
will not occur.

That this particular splice failed a few days

after the repairs, means, concludes the Company that the grievant
either did not pressure test it, or did so improperly.
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The Company's evidence on this unequivocal point is not
substantial

enough to meet the clear and convincing standard in

discipline cases.

Indeed, standing unrefuted is the grievant's

testimony that on four other occasions, pressure tests he ran on
other splices showed no problems or defects with the splice, but
a few days later leaks in the splice developed.

I conclude that

more scientific or engineering evidence of the infallibility of
the pressure test is

required to uphold the Company's absolute

position, arid that testimony, as in this case, limited to operating personnel, namely a field manager for installation and maintenance and an assistant manager of cable maintenance is not enough
Also, it is clear that in this case the subsequent splice
failure was due to an end plate that was not properly cleaned, and
through which water entered.

And that the failure to clean the

end plate or its improper installation was not the responsibility
or fault of the grievant, but had been done by some other member
of the repair crew, and was in place and its defect hidden when
the grievant took up his responsibilities on the splice.

That be-

ing so, the Company's position on the infallibility of the pressure
test, made the grievant an "absolute insurer" of the work of others
If he is to bear that responsibility especially where the direct
splice failure is attributable to the negligence of someone else,
the evidence on infallibility must be more conclusive than it is
in this case.
In the face of the grievant's testimony that he pressure
tested properly, his unrefuted testimony that leaks developed after
other satisfactory tests on other splices; and in the absence of
convincing evidence that all pressure tests are infallible with
regard to disclosing defects at the time the pressure test is made,
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the Company has not met its burden of showing, clearly and convincingly, that the grievant was proximately responsible for the
second failure of the splice.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The suspension of Gary Kacanich was not
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 5, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) "

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
• ,•
„ ,
f .
•
Communications Workers of America
,
and
p

New York Telephone

OPINION AND AWARD
NYTel Case No A87-23
CWA Case No. 1-87-31

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the five day suspension and final warning of F. Smith?
The contract provides the remedy in the event that the five
day suspension is found by the Arbitrator not to be supported by
cause.

Section 10.04

of the contract reads:

No Arbitrator shall have power or jurisdiction to modify the Company's action. The
Arbitrator shall either find that the Company's action was not without just cause,
in which event the suspension, demotion or
discharge shall be sustained in full; or
that the suspension, demotion or discharge
was without just cause, in which event the
treatment of the case shall be as set forth
in Section 10.03 of this Article.
A hearing was held on March 3, 1988 at which time Mr. Smith,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

Each side filed a post-hearing

memorandum.

The foregoing contract clause means that to sustain the five
day suspension

in this case, the Arbitrator must be satisfied not

just that cause existed for some discipline, but that a five day
suspension and final warning, not a lesser penalty, was justified.
This observation is important because in this case the Union does
not claim that the grievant was blameless or that he should not
have initially received any penalty.

The Union does not challenge
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the Company's case that the grievant made errors in attaching a
boot on a splice in a manhole or that his error or poor workmanship caused the splice to fail a few days later, resulting in a
power failure affecting more than twenty-five customers.

Rather,

the Union's position is that the grievant should not have been
suspended more than three days, because that was the recommendation of his direct supervisor, Stephen Hilbert.

And that Hilbert

was the only member of supervision who had knowledge of events
involved; that his recommendation was the one relevant to the
facts; that his recommendation therefore should have been accepted
by the Company; and that accordingly a five day suspension ordered
by District Manager Hannan, who was not familiar with the event
and who was unaware of the lesser recommendation of a three day
suspension, was excessive and wrong.

The Union argues, correctly,

in view of the provisions of Sections 10.04 and 10.03 of the contract, that if the arbitrator agrees

with that position, he must

find the five day suspension to be without cause, resulting, by
operation of the contract, in making the grievant whole for the
time lost and in the revocation of the final warning.

In short,

the Union is correct in arguing that if cause cannot be shown for
a five day suspension, and final warning, no suspension or warning
can be imposed, even if, initially a three day suspension would
have been proper.
The Union's case is based on the undisputed fact that Hilbert
recommended a three day suspension; that it was increased by
Hannan to a five day suspension and final warning based on an
erroneous report of the grievant's prior disciplinary record, without knowledge or consideration of the grievant's diligent efforts
over the two days following his installation of the boot, to cure
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any mistakes (by returning to the manhole to pump out water) and
without knowledge or consideration of the grievant's lack of
experience in doing this type of work (characterized by Hilbert
as "difficult") or the unusual difficulties he had with an inexperienced helper at the manhole.
The Union has shown that Hannan looked at a report of the
grievant's prior disciplinary record which showed three prior
suspensions, one on July 25, 1979, two on May 2 and 3, 1984 and
five (with a final warning) from July 17 to July 21, 1984.

But

that report was in error because the suspensions of May 2 and 3,
1984 were either not imposed or were changed.

The correct disci-

pline for that period was only a warning on May 2nd.

The Union

contends that Hannan fashioned the five day suspension and final
warning from an erroneous
lacks cause on that basis.

prior record and hence that penalty
Also, the Union asserts that Hilbert's

recommendation would or should have been accepted had Hannan known
(as Hilbert knew) that the grievant attempted to mitigate his work
errors by returning to the manhole twice to pump out water and
possibly "finish the job."

Also, Hannan did not know, but Hilbert

did, that the grievant's helper on the job did not know hot to use
the furnace to melt the required metal or how to lower the metal
bucket into the manhole, requiring the grievant to go up and down
the hole doing those tasks, adding to his fatigue at the end of
the work week.

Those mitigating facts, the Union points out,

known to Hilbert, but not to Hannan, add further support to the
view that cause may have existed for a three

day suspension, but

not for five days and a final warning.
The flaw in the Union's theory in this case is that it admits, by its acknowledgement of the propriety of a three day
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suspension, that the grievant handled his work assignment poorly
and negligently.

Therefore some disciplinary penalty was proper.

The Company's decision to impose a penalty of five days rather
than three can only be overturned if that decision lacked reasonable or rational grounds related to the events involved and the
grievant's overall record.
As I see it, the critical fact is that the five day penalty
and final warning was consistent with the requisite principles of
progressive discipline.

Hannan may have looked at an inaccurate

prior disciplinary record, but that erroneous record contained
enough correct information to make a five day suspension and final
warning a reasonable and logical step in a progressive discipline
sequence.

The fact is that

the "erroneous record," wrong as to

the grievant's second suspension period, was correct with regard
to his first suspension on July 25, 1975, and most importantly was
correct with regard to his five day suspension and final warning
from July 17 to July 21, 1984.

The question therefore is whether

following a one day suspension in 1979, a warning (but no suspension in 1984), and a five day suspension and final warning in
July 1984, the instant five day suspension and final warning in
April 1986 was unreasonable, illogical or arbitrary.
it was not.

In my view,

Hannan's resort to a partially erroneous prior disci-

plinary record was not prejudicial to the grievant, in view of a
prior, similar five day susepnsion and final warning two years
earlier.

And, as the instant penalty was consistent with the re-

quirements of progressive discipline (and might even be considered
lenient in that regard) the previously mentioned mitigating factors
would have been significant in my view, only if the instant penalty
had been discharge.
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Standing alone, the penalty of a five day suspension and
final warning for the grievant's work errors, after his supervisor recommended a three day suspension, may have been unsupportable and even arbitrary.

But the event does not stand alone.

It

was viewed by the Company (Hannan) against the backdrop of a prior
disciplinary record, especially the prior five day suspension and
final warning.

That being so, and in view of the Union's conces-

sion of the grievant's liability, I cannot find the Company's
decision to impose a five day suspension and final warning, rather
than the three day suspension recommended, to be unfair or improper.

To decide otherwise would be for the Arbitrator to sub-

stitute his judgment on the magnitude of the penalty when both
are proper, and the greater is neither excessive or unreasonable.
Finally, there is no claim that Hannan lacked the authority
to decide the penalty.

There is nothing in the contract, or in

practice which requires the district manager to accept the disciplinary recommendations of an employee's direct supervisor.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the five day suspension and final warning of F. Smith.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 15, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.
'

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America

A W A R D
NYTel Case No. A-87-30
CWA Case No. 1-87-71

and
New York Telephone

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether Charles Hall committed the work-time
violation for which he was suspended?
Hearings were held on July 9, July 10, September 30 and
December 21, 1987.
mitted.

An extensive number of exhibits were sub-

Each side submitted a post-hearing direct brief and a

post-hearing reply brief.

As in the Cresser case, counsel for

the Company and the Union tried this matter thoroughly and in
great detail.
As in Cresser,

this is a disciplinary case, with the bur-

den on the Company to establish Hall's culpability by clear and
convincing evidence.

This standard must be met, especially where,

as here, the charge against Hall is synonymous with "stealing
time."
As with Cresser, the Company has presented a case of considerable circumstantial evidence which has raised understandable suspicions regarding Hall's whereabouts from whenever he
was dispatched until 9:30 AM when he arrived at the location of
his assignment on June 9, 1986.

But, as in Cresser, it is my

conclusion, after careful study of the entire record before me,
that the Company's case falls short of meeting the "clear and
convincing"

burden.

The evidence and testimony on when he was dispatched is
conflicting and unclear.

And in the absence of direct or

-2compelling contrary evidence that he was in fact off the job, or
that the time in question was improperly used, Hall's explanation
of his whereabouts cannot be discredited.
In the absence of the requisite evidence, I cannot uplift
the Company's circumstantial case to the required "clear and
convincing" level.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company has not clearly and convincingly
shown that Charles Hall committed the worktime violation for which he was suspended.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 4, 1988
STATE OF New York )s
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
and
New York Telephone

A W A R D
NYTEL Case No. A-87~30
CWA Case No. 1-87-71

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did Harry Cresser commit the work time violation for which he was suspended within the
meaning of Work Time Violations on page 22 of
the Codes We Work By and as referred to in the
June 9, 1986 Agreement and attached correspondence?
This case required four hearings.
exhibits were submitted.
brief

An extensive number of

Each side filed a post-hearing direct

and a post-hearing reply brief.

Rarely has this Arbitrator

experienced respective cases tried by counsel for the Union and
Company in such detail and with such thoroughness.
I have studied the record of the four days of hearing, the
many exhibits and the briefs and I am confident that my decision
is based on a most careful consideration
is before me.

and analysis of all that

I have chosen to render my decision without an

Opinion.
This is a disciplinary case. It is not for the grievant to
prove his innocence.

It is the Company's burden to establish his

culpability of the work violation charged by clear and convincing
evidence.

Here the charge is synonymous with "stealing time."

The Company has presented a case of circumstantial evidence,
and has raised substantial suspicions regarding the grievant's
whereabouts between 1 PM and 1:55 PM on August 22, 1986.

But it

is my conclusion that that case falls short of meeting the "clear
and convincing" burden.

In the absence of direct evidence of the

grievant's whereabouts during the time involved or direct evidence
that he was in fact off the job, I am not prepared to dismiss his
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explanations or find them so implausible and unbelievable as to
uplift the Company's case to the required "clear and convincing"
level.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company has not clearly and convincingly
shown that Harry Cresser committed the work
time violation for which he was suspended
within the meaning of Work Time Violations
on page 22 of the Codes We Work By and as
referred to in the June 9, 1986 Agreement and
attached correspondence.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 30, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

\
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Transport Workers Union, Local

1400
OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance # 15T-87

and
The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey

The stipulated issue is:

i

•

Did the Authority breach the contract when
it forfeited vacation pay of the following
employees: Robin Lampariello
Felix Berfet
James Calalerese
James Gartmond
and others similarly situated, if any? If
so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on March 16, 1988 at which time representatives of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, hereinafter referred to as the "Authority" and the Transport Workers
Union, Local 1400, hereinafter referred to as the "Union" appeared
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken and the
parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The aforesaid employees, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants," all incurred documented injuries on the job which
kept them out of active employment for extended periods of time
during the 1987 vacation year.

Each received full pay for the

entire period of their absences under a supplemental sick leave
plan.

But the Authority reduced the maximum vacation allowances

of each grievant by five days.

It is this latter action that is

grieved herein.
The Authority asserts that its five day reduction of each
grievant's 1987 vacation allowance was pursuant to the express
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language of Section III C of the Operating Rules set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement.
That Section reads:
III.
C.

Vacation in Connection with Sick Leave
An employee who is absent for an extended
period because of illness or injury, whether
work connected or not, and who received paid
sick leave for a part or all of the period
of absence, may be required to forfeit a portion or all of his normal vacation allowance.
Department heads will recommend to the Personnel Director for his approval, the appropriate
action to be taken in such cases.

Additionally, the Authority argues that its action was pursuant to a long standing, unvaried practice which has been consistently applied not only during the term of the collective bargaining relationship but which predated that relationship.
The Union contends that the controlling language is that
of the following paragraph of Exhibit I [Sick Leave Absence Plan],
also set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.

That Sec-

tion reads:
Days lost as a result of a documented injury
on duty shall result in both a diminution of
the employee's bank and count as sick absence
days except the first occurrence, and only the
first occurrence of day or days lost as a direct result of such injury on duty.
Juxtaposing the two aforesaid contract provisions the Union
asserts that the grievants' absences, as "the first occurrence"
within the meaning of Exhibit I and which are not to be used to
diminish an employee's bank for sick leave, cannot therefore be
deemed an absence "because of illness or injury" under Section III
C of Attachment I.

Hence, under that circumstance, concludes the

Union the grievants 1 absences due to injuries on the job do not
qualify as absences under Section III C,for which forfeiture of
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of vacation is permitted.
Moreover the Union claims that the loss of five days vacation allowance was a forfeiture and hence a penalty.

It reasons

that as a penalty it constitutes a form of discipline, and cannot
be imposed without a hearing as required by PAI2Q-3.01, "Disciplinary Proceedings - Permanent Classified Employees."

The Union asks

that the Arbitrator void the reduction in vacation allowances because no hearing was held.
It is a well settled principle of contract law that contract
clauses which may appear to be in conflict or inconsistent should
be reconciled if reasonably possible.

And if not, then any result-

ant conflict or ambiguity is to be resolved by past practice, if
there be one.
In the instant case either approach supports the Authority's
action.

Section III C of Attachment 1, standing alone, is clear

and unambiguous as applied to this case.
of vacation allowance

It calls for a reduction

in the case of an employee with an extended

absence from work because of a work-connected

injury.

And it is

applicable to such an employee who received paid sick leave during
that absence.

Here the grievants were absent for that reason and

I conclude that the compensation they received during the period
of their absences was sick leave compensation within the meaning
of III C.
There is however the question of whether those absences
should not be so deemed for the purposes of III C because they were
the "first occurrence" within the meaning of the aforesaid Section
of Exhibit I [Sick Leave Absence Plan].

I conclude that those

absences are not exempted from III C.
Exhibit I is entitled "Sick Leave Absence Plan."

The

-4contract language relied on by the Union provides not for the
preservation of a vacation allowance but rather for the preservation of the employee's sick leave bank and sick leave entitlement.
What it does is to prohibit the first occurrence of an absence due
to a documented injury on the job from being used to reduce sick
benefits and sick pay.

It neither mentions nor does it provide

for any impact on vacation allowance.

Here the grievants did not

suffer a reduction in their sick leave bank or in their sick leave
entitlement, but rather received full pay under a supplemental
sick leave plan for the entire periods of their absences.

Hence

the two contract provisions referred to above are not in conflict,
and therefore I must reject the Union's claim that Exhibit I [Sick
Leave Absence Plan] controls or affects the application or interpretation of III C.
I do not agree with the Union that the Authority's action
was disciplinary in nature or a penalty falling within the discipline sections of the contract.

The grievants were not disciplined.

They did not lose vacation time as a result of a disciplinary penalty.

Rather, their loss of some vacation allowance was under the

Operating Rules-Vacations [Attachment I] of the contract, and was
the consequence of their extended absences due to job-related
injuries.

The contract provision which enumerates loss of vacation

as discipline is obviously for use when an employee has committed
some misconduct or some breach of the contract warranting discipline
In that event the contract permits the Authority to use the diminution of the vacation allowance as a disciplinary penalty.

But

at the threshold is the requirement that it be a disciplinary case.
The instant case is not disciplinary.

Put another way, there are

two contract provisions permitting a reduction in the vacation
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allowance.

One, applicable here, where the employee has been out

of work for an extended period of time due to a job related injury and during which time he received sick pay.

The other, which

is not present here, is when there is cause to discipline an employee and the Authority elects to impose as a penalty a loss in
vacation allowance.

I find that the instant facts fall under the

former, not the latter.
The Union has also raised the question of disparate treatment.

It claims that other employees who were absent because of

job-related injuries and who received sick pay did not have their
vacation entitlements reduced.

Moreover the Union questions the

Authority's formula under which it decided on a five-day vacation
allowance reduction for each grievant when their respective absences
were of significantly different durations.
The record before me establishes that those employees who
suffered no vacation losses were absent for short periods, all less
than 30 days, and that under the Authority's procedures and practice only employees with absences in excess of thirty days had
their vacation allowances reduced.

Though the periods of absences

of the grievants differ, they all exceeded 30 days.

I cannot find

the Authority's decision to reduce each grievant's vacation allowance by five days to be arbitrary, or an unreasonable exercise of
the Authority's discretionary power implicit in the provisions of
III C.

The language that "an employee...may be required to for-

feit a portion...of his normal vacation allowance," and the final
sentence which accords Department heads the power to recommend
appropriate action to the Personnel Director vests the Authority
with reasonable discretionary rights in deciding on the amount of
the vacation reduction.

I cannot find that the Authority's

-
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decision to uniformly reduce each grievant's vacation

allowance

by five days is inconsistent or wrong under that contract language,
especially where as here all the grievants were absent for extended
periods.

As I do not find that a five-day reduction in the vaca-

tion allowance was improper for the grievant with the least amount
of time absent I obviously cannot fault it for the grievant with
the most time absent.
Even if the aforesaid contract clauses are not reconciled
and consequently an ambiguity is raised, the uncontroverted evidence and testimony by the Authority that its practice consistent
with the action taken in this case has been applied regularly and
uniformly not only during the life of the collective bargaing
relationship but even before that relationship began, resolves the
dispute and any contract ambiguity favorably to the Authority.
Accordingly, the Undersigned

Impartial Chairman under the

collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
makes the following AWARD:
The Authority did not breach the contract
when it forfeited vacation pay of Robin
Lampariello; Felix Berfet; James Calalerese;
James Gartmond and others similarly situated.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: June 27, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Scarpelli, et al

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #17 300 0124 87

and
Richard Sachs Interiors, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Are the individuals named below entitled to
any fringe benefit or wage compensation from
Richard Sachs Interiors, Inc.? If so, what
is the amount thereof?
Roseanne Scarpelli, Bruce Sachareff,
Thomas Kelly, Ruth Bird, Herman
Malberg.
The parties agreed that the arbitrator would decide the
threshold issue of whether Richard Sachs Interiors, hereinafter
referred to as the Company or as Richard Sachs Interiors, has
any liability to the above-named grievants under individual employment arrangements negotiated with the grievants when the
Company tried to operate non-union, and before it was found to
be the successor to Sachs, New York.
A hearing was held on February 18, 1988 at which time
representatives of the grievants and the above-named Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
side filed a post-hearing

Each

brief.

There is no serious dispute over the fact that the Company
offered certain employment conditions to the grievants which caused
them to leave Sachs, New York and join the Company.

I find that

the grievants' switch of employment from Sachs, New York to the
Company, the testimony about those verbal offers; the reliance

-2of the grievants on the conditions offered and the grievants'
performances, constitute persuasive evidence of bilateral employment agreements between the Company and each grievant.
The initial question is whether those oral individual
employment arrangements or contracts are valid and enforceable
with Company liability thereunder, or whether they were voided
by the NLRB proceeding and settlement under which the Company was
deemed the successor to Sachs, New York and the collective bargaining agreement covering Sachs, New York was made applicable
to the Company, retroactively covering the period of the individua
agreements.
Critical to the determination of the legal question of
liability in this arbitration, is the fact that the parties to
this arbitration are the grievants individually, and the Company.
Local 888 UFCW, the union involved, is not a party to this case.
Hence, matters which require the Union's participation if not
initiative, are not jurisdictionally before me in this

arbitration.

Thus, though the individual contracts or work arrangements
may theoretically constitute a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement

or the Union's representational rights thereunder, and

may violate the general principle that without the consent of the
bargaining agent, an employer may not make separate agreements with
bargaining

unit members covered by a collective agreement, that

question is not within my jurisdiction in this case.
requires a union complaint of contract breach.

Such a case

This is not a

case of alleged breach of a collective agreement, and that question
cannot be decided in the absence of the Union's object to the
individual contracts and its absence as a party to this arbitration case.

Indeed, in this case it is impossible to tell whether

the Union agreed to or acquiesced in the arrangement or whether
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it does or does not object.
Based on the settlement reached by the Company and Local
888 in the NLRB proceeding, it was agreed that the collective
bargaining agreement originally covering the employees of Sachs,
New York (including some of the grievants) was applicable to
Richard Sachs Interiors, Inc., as the Sachs, New York successor,
and to its bargaining unit employees (including the grievants
and/or their job classifications).
Accordingly, those individual contracts may also theoretically constitute an unfair labor practice if honored by and enforced against the Company because they may represent a failure by
the Company to bargain with the certified bargaining agent over
the conditions of employment covering the grievants and/or their

j obs.
But that question is a matter for the NLRB and for application and interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act.

As

such, it is beyond the jurisdictional competence of this arbitration, and again, the Union's unfair labor practice charge and/or
at least its participation in any such action is needed.

Neither

are part of this arbitration, nor in the absence of the Union can
the parties give the arbitrator the authority to decide a Labor
Board issue.

Also, it should be noted, that the NLRB the agency

with authority over unfair labor practice charges, is not a party
hereto and has not participated in any way which would give me
authority

to bind it.

Therefore, as between the grievants and the Company, the
only parties to this arbitration, I must find the individual employment contracts to be valid and enforceable, and the Company
liable thereunder to the grievants.

They were entered into in
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good faith by both sides; the grievants relied on them in changing
their employment; and all the requisite elements of a valid contract were present.

Absent a ruling by another forum, The Company

may not in this proceeding avoid those agreements on grounds based
on the collective bargaining agreement or the National Labor
Relations Act.
The rights of the grievants, Richard Sachs Interiors, Inc.,
and Local 888 in any such other proceedings are expressly reserved
If the parties wish, they may jointly refer back to me
questions and issues on the specific obligations of the Company
to the grievants under the individual agreements, if such matters
cannot otherwise be resolved, or if other proceedings in other
forums are not dispositive of the issues.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 16, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ° " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
SEA CREST HEALTH CARE CENTER
-and-

CONSENT AWARD

LOCAL 144, SEIU, AFL-CIO
Grievance of Marie Edouard

x
The above-described

parties are presently before me

in a grievance arbitration with regard to the discharge of
Marie Edouard.
which

all

A

hearing was

parties

had

an

held on June 16, 1988, at

opportunity

to

present all

relevant testimony.
After
1987,

the

the

parties

settlement in
follows:
Ms.

conclusion

of

informed

this case

me

and had

Edouard's

grievance
Sea

thousand dollars

Ms. Edouard
Home in a per

Saturdays.

that

they

had reached

agreed to resolve it as

against Sea Crest is withdrawn,

Crest

is

is to

pay

Ms.

Edouard six

back pay, less deduction

claims against

Sea Crest;

begin employment at Shore View Nursing

diem capacity,

week,

to

($6,000.00) in

for PICA, in settlement of all

per

hearing on June 16,

Sea Crest is to rescind Ms. Edouard's discharge;

with prejudice;

days

the

to

include

working at

least three (3)

Sundays, but not to include

I

find

this

resolution

to

be

responsible

and

sensible and therefore made it my Award as follows:
The discharge of Marie Edouard by Sea
Crest Health Care Center is rescinded; Marie
Edouard's grievance
against Sea Crest is
withdrawn, with prejudice; Sea Crest shall pay
to
Marie
Edouard
six
thousand dollars
($6,000.00) in back pay, less deduction for
PICA, in settlement of all claims against Sea
Crest, said payment shall be made within ten
(10) days of the date hereof; Marie Edouard
shall become an employee at Shore View Nursing
Home in a per diem capacity, working at least
three (3) days per week, to include Sundays,
but not to include Saturdays.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September

, 1988

STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF
)ss.:
I, Eric J. Schmertz, do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, SEIU
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Seacrest Health Care Facility

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Michael Peart? If not what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on April 19 and May 3, 1988, at which time
Mr0 Peart, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

Each side filed a post-hearing memo-

randum.
Let me come right to the point.

The Employer has clearly and

convincingly shown that the grievant committed the offenses which
caused his discharge.

I find, contrary to the Union's defense,

that the grievant was not justifiably provoked nor is there an
acceptable explanation to excuse his conduct.
I find that the grievant, angrily and purposefully spilled
soup on the steam table, causing it to run over the top and down
the sides of the steam table.

I do not accept the explanation that

this is a common or unavoidable occurrence when pouring soup into
the steam table receptacle.
I find that the grievant, angry because that incident was
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reported to supervision by employee Anesta Bryant, confronted
Bryant in a threatening and frightening manner, used obscene
language to her and acted towards her in a way that caused her
to reasonably believe that he might assault her physically. Her
resultant hysteria and crying was an understandable and logical
consequence of the grievant's abusive language and direct threats
The Employer has also established that the grievant left his
post before his scheduled quitting time on the day of the conference .
In view of the foregoing I find no need to determine whether
his "punchout" at his normal quitting time was fraudulent, and,
because it was not a reason for the discharge, I find no need to
determine whether the grievant "bribed" a fellow employee to give
false testimony in this matter.
What has been proved is adequate and sufficient grounds for
discipline.

The question is whether it is grounds for discharge.

The Employer relies in part, in support of discharge, on the griev
ant's prior disciplinary record, asserting that there have been
previous incidents where the grievant engaged in "uncontrolled"
behavior.
By doing so, I conclude, that impliedly, the Employer believe
that the discharge penalty was the culmination of a process of
"progressive discipline" and that progressive discipline is
applicable in this case0

I accept that theory.

But in doing so,

I find that though the Employer points to earlier incidents of
outbursts and verbal abuse of others by the grievant, it never
suspended the grievant for that behavior.

A suspension is a
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required step before discharge where progressive discipline is
applicable.
Therefore I deem the appropriate penalty in this matter to
be a disciplinary suspension.
However, in restoring the grievant to work without back pay
and by treating the period between his discharge and reinstatement as a disciplinary suspension, I also impose on him another
condition.
It may be that the instant facts and his prior record resulted from the particular locale at which he works and may be
triggered by his inability to get along with certain other employees with whom he works or comes into contact with at that
locale.

Therefore I also direct that the grievant be transferred

to some other facility owned or operated by this Employer, and
that his reinstatement without back pay be to and at that other
facility.

DATED: November 21, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 282, I.B.T.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #17-300-0141-88

and
Southhampton Lumber Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Gary
Cowell? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association on August 31, 1988 at which time Mr. Cowell, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were af-

forded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for what the Company alleges were
various violations of the Company work rules and policies, to wit:
1.

Removing five panels of sheet rock from
the Company's yard without authorization
or required documentation;

2.

Use of and removal of a Company truck from
the yard without permission;

3.

Failure to stop the truck at the gate booth
upon leaving the yard for inspection by the
guard;

4.

Upon questioning, falsified the planned use
of the sheet rock that was removed from the
yard.

This is a discharge case, with the burden on the Company to
prove the grievant's culpability by evidence that is clear and
convincing.

The Company has done so with regard to charges 2, 3,
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and 4 above, but not with regard to charge 1.
The Company's evidence and testimony that the grievant used
a Company truck and took it off Company premises without authorization is clearly established.

The Company Manager's testimony

that he did not give the grievant permission to do so, was unequivocal and unimpeached.

The best the grievant could say to

this charge was that he "thought he had asked for permission"
and "thought that the Company Manager said OK" (emphasis added).
I accept the Manager's version.
It is undisputed that upon leaving the yard, the grievant
did not stop the truck for inspection by the gate attendant.

It

is also undisputed that the grievant knew the Company rule requiring the stop.

Indeed, the requirement to stop, is prominently

posted on signs at the gate.

The grievant's explanation is that

he did not see the attendant in the gate house; and therefore
continued through and out without stopping.
unacceptable for two reasons.

That explanation is

The gate attendant, who apparently

is a friend of the grievant, and who would have no reason to
testify falsely, stated that

he was in the gate house; that he

saw the grievant exit at an

accelerated speed and that he whis-

tled and yelled at him to stop, unavailingly.
to discount that testimony.

I find no reason

Also, whether the grievant saw the

guard on exiting is immaterial.

It was his duty to stop and then

to make certain whether or not the guard was present.

I do not

believe that the grievant could have been certain that the guard
was not there by not stopping.

Under the Company's rules, a stop

is mandated, whether or not the guard is immediately noticeable.
The grievant conceeds that upon initial questioning he
falsified the reason for removing the sheet rock.

At first he
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claimed it was for his own personal use, and later admitted it
was for a friend.

The grievant also admits that he knew of the

Company rule allowing employees to buy material from the Company
only for their own personal use, and
any commercial venture.

not for anyone else or for

At the hearing the grievant disclosed

that the sheet rock was for a profit-making project (the installation of a ceiling for a third person) that he and a friend were
working on.

So, by his own admission, the grievant planned to use

the sheet rock for a purpose proscribed by Company rules, and
initially falsified his response.
The most serious charge is the first.

Though founded as a

violation of Company rules and policies, it is obvious that the
Company is charging the grievant with theft.

The grievant's

culpability with regard to charges 2, 3 and 4 raise significant
suspicions with regard to charge #1.
And although charge #1, and even the charge of theft can be
established by circumstantial evidence, that evidence, because
the charge parallels a crime, must be demonstrably clear and
convincing.

Here, the Company's case falls short of that standard

Employees may remove material (for their own use) provided
they get a purchase ticket, made out by another employee with
authority to sell or charge the material to the employee before
leaving the yard.

In the instant case, the Company asserts that

the grievant did not get a ticket before he

left; that upon his

return, and apparently after he learned that the Company was inquiring about his conduct, he obtained a ticket from a Company
salesman.

The Company contends that this after-obtained ticket

was a coverup of his improper removal of the sheet rock and an
effort to legitimatize a theft.
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The evidentiary problem with the Company's case in this regard is two fold.

First, upon returning to the yard, immediately

after entering the gate, and upon questioning by the guard, the
grievant produced the purchase ticket showing that five pieces
of sheet rock were charged to him COD.

The guard so testified.

Absent evidence to the contrary, I must conclude that because the
grievant produced the ticket at that time without any opportunity
to first go into the office, he must have had the ticket when he
left the yard with the sheet rock.

It is only speculative, and

unsupported by evidence to think that some way while he was out
of the yard,

he got back into the office and obtained a ticket

before his official re-entry.
Secondly, the Company's position that the grievant obtained
the ticket at about 3:30 PM, at least an hour after he left the
yard, is based on what the manager testified he was told by the
salesman who issued the ticket.

But that saleman, a Mr. Perry,

was not called to testify as a witness by the Company.

So, not

only is that critical information hearsay, and not subject to the
adversarial test of cross-examination, but I think, simply, it
may have been a mistake as to the time.
Therefore, as the Company's case on charge #1 is primarily
based on the grievant's removal of the sheet rock without proper
documentat ion it is fatally undermined by the evidence that the
grievant did have the proper documentation in the form of a COD
ticket.

Therefore the charge of improper removal of the sheet

rock, or theft or mis-appropriation has not been clearly and convincingly established, the other circumstantial evidence notwith-
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standing.
Based on the foregoing, I do not find enough to sustain the
charges, but there is enough to justify and sustain a disciplinary
suspens ion.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discharge of
Gary Cowell.
There is just cause for a disciplinary suspension. The discharge is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension for the period
of time Mr. Cowell has been out. He shall be
reinstated, but without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 6, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY

INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture
Laboratory Film Technicians

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Technicolor

The stipulated issue is:
Has Technicolor violated Section 9(a) of the
contract by denying overtime to a night shift
operator and by temporarily transferring an
employee into the applicable classification?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 22, 1988 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It is the Union's contention that my Award of June 19, 1985,
in which I upheld an employer's right under the industry-wide
contract, to use temporary transfers to cover work in positive
developing, without the need to offer that work on an overtime
basis to employees in the department, was varied by a subsequent
verbal agreement between this Company and the Union.

The Union

asserts that under the verbal agreement, the Company would first
offer the available, uncovered work to other employees in the
positive developing department on an overtime basis, and would
only use temporary transfers if the overtime offers were refused.

- 2-

The evidence shows that the arrangement the Union claims
applicable was at one time agreed to between representatives of
the parties for the printing department, and has been a
consistent practice in the negative developing department.
However, the evidence on whether there was such an agreement
applicable to the positive developing department, the situation
in the instant case, is unclear, offsetting and hence
inconclusive.

The Union testimony is that the discussions

regarding the procedure for coverage of vacant work (resulting
from absences, vacations, etc.) went beyond the printing
department and negative developing, and included positive
developing.

The Company testimony is contrary.

It is to the

effect that the agreement was limited to the printing department
(superceded thereafter by the reclassification of an employee to
provide a regular positive developer when needed).
It is undisputed that the arrangement in the negative
developing department pre-dated the verbal discussions and is not
claimed to have been part of those talks.
The aforesaid testimony was respectively by the two persons
who held those talks, namely the Union President and the Company
Vice President-Operations.

No other testimony or evidence was

adduced to support either position.
The burden is on the grieving party, the Union, to prove its
case clearly and convincingly.

I cannot conclude that it has met

that burden, under these circumstances.

I am fully satisfied

that the respective testimony was the honest recollection of both
men.

I just don't think they communicated well with regard to
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the positive development department.

Also, it seems to me under

that circumstance where misunderstanding is quite possible, that
if my prior Award and therefore the interpretation of the
contract was to be changed, some written confirmation of a matter
of that consequence should have been made.

Or it would have been

memorialized in some more probative and conclusive manner.
Therefore, while there may have been a verbal agreement to
offer overtime first before using temporary transfers in the
positive developing department, it has not been adequately proved
in this proceeding.
The Undersigned Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proof and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD.
Technicolor did not violate Section 9(a) of
the contract by denying overtime to a night
shift operator and by temporarily
>
transferring an employee into the applicable
classification.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: July 26, 1988
STATE OF
New York )
'co •
COUNTY OF New York )b:"I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in an who executed
this instrument, which is my Award.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. - PILOTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots 1 Association

AWARD
Case 106-87 and 108-87

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Trans World Airlines,
Inc. - Pilots' System Board of Adjustment, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above-named Union and Company,
make the following AWARD:
The Company had just and sufficient cause for
disciplining Victor Collin and John Coote for
the reasons assigned in Captain W. J. Moran's
letters dated to them August 24, 1987.

DATED:
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ss

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Rex A. Pitts
Concurring

I, Rex A. Pitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Sal J. Fallucco
Concurring

I, Sal J. Fallucco do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Donald H. Brown, Jr.
Dissenting

I, Donald H. Brown, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Paul Sedlak
Dissenting

I, Paul Sedlak, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. - PILOTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots' Association

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case 106-87 and 108-87

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the Company had just and sufficient cause for disciplining the grievants for
the reasons assinged in Captain W. J. Moran's
letters dated to them August 24, 1987. If not,
what shall the remedy be?
Hearings were held in London, England on February 3 and
February 4, 1988 at which time the grievants, Victor Collin and
John Coote, and representatives
Company appeared.

of the above-named Union and

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
The Board of Arbitration consisted of the Undersigned as
Chairman, Captains Donald H. Brown, Jr. and Paul Sedlak, the
Union designees, and Captain Rex A. Pitts and Mr. Sal J. Fallucco,
the Company designees.

The Arbitrators' Oath was waived; a steno-

graphic record was taken, and each side filed a post-hearing
brief.

Thereafter the Board met in executive session in New York

City.
Collin and Coote were respectively the First Officer and
Flight Engineer on Flight 700 (B747) from JFK Airport in New York
City to Heathrow Airport in London, England on July 16 and 17,
1987.

Commanding the flight was Captain Conrad Ereon.

flew the flight on assignment from Ereon.

Collin

Ereon retired from his

employment with the Company following the incident which gave rise
to the discipline and this arbitration case, and hence was not
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disciplined.

Ee is not a grievant herein, but he was a witness

and testified.
The letters from Captain W. J. Moran to the grievants, which
set forth the charges against them read respectively as follows:
"Dear Mr. Collin:
The investigation you were informed of by letter
dated July 17, 1987 has been concluded. The results of this investigation are as follows:
You were second in commard of Flight 700 on July
16, 1987 from JFK - LHR. You were flying this
leg of the flight. During the approach to LHR,
you failed to request that the landing gear be
lowered or 25 degrees of flaps selected. You
also failed to call for the completion of the
landing final check list. The Captain and Flight
Engineer failed to cross-check these items and
provide the necessary backup.
As the aircraft descended through 500' AGL, the
GPWS warning activated. Although you were unable
to detect the cause of these warnings, you continued the approach. The LHR Tower Controller,
who was working your flight, observed that your
landing gear was not extended and stated first
"TWA 700 check gear," and then, "TWA 700 go
around." The aircraft descended to an altitude
of less than 100' with the landing gear retracted
and the flaps not properly positioned for landing.
Your position during our discussion of this incident was that you would not have landed with the
GPWS warning sounding; however, I find no evidence
that a go-around was initiated until instructed by
the tower controller.
Operation of a TWA flight in this manner is contrary to a multitude of policies and procedures
which have been established to ensure a safe operation for our passengers and aircraft.
You are charged with the following violations of
TWA policy and procedures:
1. Failure to extend the landing gear and flaps
in accordance with the procedures as described in
the Flight Proficiency and Standards Section and
Chapter 2 of the Boeing 747 Flight Handbook.
2. Failure to execute the Landing Final Check List
as prescribed in Chapter 2 of the Boeing 747 Flight
Handbook.
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3. Failure to follow proper procedures relative to
the Ground Proximity Warning as prescribed in the
Boeing 747 Flight Handbook, page 2.40.03.
4. Failure to comply with F.O.P., Chapter 4,
Personnel Regulations, B.l.b., B.l.c and B.l.d.
5. Failure to comply with F.O.P., Chapter 6,
Flight Crew Member's General Responsibilities,
A.3., Chapter 6, Flight Crew Operating Policy,
L.l.t, L.l.ee and L.l.gg.
6. Creating an incident which caused TWA adverse
publicity.
Your operation of Flight 700 on approach to London
violated safety policies of a most serious nature.
The total breakdown of crew coordination and lack
of vigilance on the part of the entire flight crew
could have resulted in a disastrous situation. A
lapse of cockpit discipline and awareness which
allows a Boeing 747 to descend to less than 100'
above the ground with the landing gear still retracted and the flaps not in the landing position
constitutes dangerous and reckless operation of
an aircraft, and cannot be tolerated.
The facts and circumstances of this incident clearly
warrant termination of the flight crew; however in
consideration of your previous record of employment,
I intend to effect the following discipline:
You will be suspended from the payroll of Trans
World Airlines for a period of twelve (12) months.
The above action will be subject to the time limits
specified in Section 21 of the current Working
Agreement.
very truly yours,
w. J. Moran
General Manager
Flying
JFK"
"Dear Mr. Coote:
The investigation you were informed of by letter
dated July 17, 1987 has been concluded. The results of this investigation are as follows:
You were the Flight Engineer on Flight 700 of July 16,
1987 from JFK - LHR. The First Officer was flying
this leg of the flight. during the approach to LHR, the
First Officer failed to request that the landing gear
be lowered or 25 degrees of flaps selected. The First
Officer also failed to call for the completion of the
landing final check list. You and the Captain failed
to cross-check these items and provide the necessary
backup.

-4As the aircraft descended through 500' AGL,
the GPWS war ing activated. You were unable to detect the cause of these warnings.
The LHR Tower Controller, who was working
your flight, observed that your landing gear
was not extended and stated first "TWA 700
check gear," and then, "TWA 700 go around."
The aircraft descended to an altitude of less
than 100' with the landing gear retracted and
the flaps not properly positioned for landing.
Your position during our discussion of this
incident was that you were expecting the crew
to go around; however, you were unable to diagnose the course [sic] of the warnings nor detect that the landing gear and flaps were not
in the proper position for landing. As Flight
Engineer, you are responsible for the final
check of these items.
Operation of a TWA flight in this manner is
contrary to a multitude of policies and procedures which have been established to ensure
a safe operation for our passengers and aircraft.
You are charged with the following violations
of TWA policy and procedures:
1. Failure to cross-check flaps and landing
gear and call to the Captain's attention any
descrepancies [sic] noticed as prescribed on
Page 2.01.01 in the Boeing 747 Flight Handbook.
2. Failure to execute the Landing Final Check
List as prescribed in Capter 2 of the Boeing
747 Flight Handbook.
3. Failure to follow proper procedures relative
to the Ground Proximity Warning as prescribed in
the Boeing 747 Flight Handbook, Page 2.40.03.
4. Failure to comply with P.O.P., Chapter 4,
Personnel Regulations, B.l.b., B.l.c. and B.l.d.
5. Failure to comply with F.O.P., Chapter 6,
Flight Crew Member's General Responsibilities,
A.3., Chapter 6, Flight Crew Operating Policy, L.l.t,
L.k.ee, L.l.gg and L.2.b.
6. Creating an incident which caused TWA adverse
publicity.
The operation of Flight 700 on approach to London
violated safety policies of a most serious nature.
The total breakdown of crew coordination and lack of
vigilance on the part of the entire flight crew
could have resulted in a disastrous situation. A
lapse of cockpit discispline and awareness which
allows a Boeing 747 to descend to less than 100'
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above the ground with the landing gear still
retracted and the flaps not in the landing
position constitutes dangerous and reckless
operation of an aircraft, and cannot be
tolerated.
The facts and circumstances of this incident
clearly warrant termination of the flight crew;
however, in consideration of your previous record
of employment, I intend to effect the following
discipline.
You will be suspended from the payroll of Trans
World Airlines for a period of twelve (12)
months.
The above action will be subject to the time
limits specified in Section 21 of the current
Working Agreement.
Very truly yours,
W. J. Moran
General Manager
Flying
JFK"
I conclude that several disputed matters need not be decided.
I need not decide if the aircraft pulled up and came around because the ground proximity warning system was activated or because the crew was notified by a Heathrow Air Traffic Controller
that the landing gear and wheels were not down, or whether the
pullup was initiated simultaneously with both.
I need not decide whether Collin, who was flying the plane
had the duty to respond immediately to the ground proximity warning system, by pulling up immediately, or whether he was correct
in hesitating momentarily at the command of Ereon (who acknowledged he stayed the pull-up momentarily to attempt to determine
if the

warning was a "false alarm").

Also, I need not determine to what exact altitude the plane
descended before it pulled up.

I need not determine if Coote had

a duty, albeit without technical qualification to be prepared to
take over the flight and execute a pull-up if Ereon and Collin
failed to do so.
I need not determine if the plane was "in danger" at any
point during its descent and until the pull-up, the come around,
the lowering of the gear and the subsequent successful landing
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had been accomplished.
I need not decide, speculatively whether the plane would
have landed with its landing gear up, if the air controller had
not seen the problem and communicated it to the crew.
I need not decide these things because none of them would
have happened or come into issue if the crew had properly carried
out the prescribed landing procedures and regulations.

And I

need not decide them because I conclude that the discipline imposed on the grievants was contractually proper for the offenses
which the grievants (and Ereon) admit they did commit, and that
the one year suspension for each grievant for those offenses was
not excessive, discriminatory or disparate.
The grievants and Ereon admit that they failed to lower the
landing gear and wheels, and to adjust the flap settings at the
prescribed altitude in the course of the landing approach.

They

admit they did not go through the prescribed landing check list
prior to and during the descent and approach to landing, and admit
that had they done so, they would have discovered that Ereon
failed to order and activate lowering the landing gear.
All three, the grievants and Ereon are therefore responsible
for that threshold and critical failure, which then led to the
aforesaid consequential events.

Had each and all three met their

separate and collective threshold obligations with regard to the
rules and procedures for landing, the wheels would have been
lowered, the flaps properly set, and none of the subsequent events
would have happened.
They admit that the plane had descended to as low as 173 feet
from the ground, with a landing a matter of seconds away, before
the pullup was executed.
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Frankly, I do not know whether the plane was technically or
in fact "in danger," or whether the pull-up could be executed
safely at whatever its altitude was when executed, or even if
it can be done at 100 feet or even lower.

What I do conclude

however is that the plane was being flown under "unsafe" conditions in violation of and within the proscription of the Company's
rules and regulations

for flight and landing operations.

I con-

clude that the several hundred passengers aboard were "at risk"
under conditions to which they should not have been subjected.
Manifestly,

the requirements and regulations cited in

Captain Moran's letters are designed and needed to insure the
safe operation of the flight.

Equally manifest and incontest-

able is the fact that those rules and regulations are reasonable
for and relevant to a passenger airline, and like any other employer, the Company has the right to make and enforce rules for
safety.

The nature of this industry; the fact that responsibility

for the lives and well being of hundreds of passengers are placed
in the hands of the airline and its crews, makes the promulgation
and compliance with rules for the safe operation of flights, including landing procedures, so compellingly proper as to defy
serious dispute.
By neglecting

to lower the landing gear; by neglecting to go

through the check list for landing, by descending to 173 feet or
less with the gear still up and the flaps unset, the grievants
were responsible for flying or permitting the plane to fly, with
passengers aboard, in a manner that was egregiously unsafe
(whether or not the plane was "in danger") because

their fail- -

ures were in direct violation of a compellingly proper safety rule
Unfortunately that the grievants and Ereon could give me no
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explanation for what happened, compounds their errors.

It means

that nothing unusual or distracting was going on at the time to
divert their attention from carrying out each prescribed step of
the landing check list.

They made a mistake but can offer no

explanations in mitigation.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation, I must conclude
that they were grossly negligent, and that severe discipline for
that negligence was appropriate.
I do not find that the one year suspensions are excessive or
disparate.

The other cases cited by the Union, in which less

severe penalties were imposed were not subjected to adversary
analysis in the hearing before me, so that I cannot assess, on a
probative basis, any substantive similarities between them and
the instant matter.

Nor, on the informtion given, can I find the

facts to be sufficiently similar or whether they remain relevant
after the passage of many years.

In the instant case, I have

found that the grievants were responsible for putting hundreds
of passengers at fearful and unnecessary risk.

I do not know

whether the other cited cases carried the same potential risk.
But most significant, in the instant case, and to the grievants prejudice, they had no mitigating explanation for their
negligence.

I do not know if such a degree of negligence was

present in the other matters cited by the Union.

The absence of

evidence of unexplained negligence in thecited matters, makes them
inapposite to the instant case.
I personally agree with part of the "Epilogue" in the Union's
brief.

I am certain that the grievants will never again fail to

lower the landing gear and set the flaps at the proper point in
the landing procedure; and will never again fail to go through
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the landing check-list.

Assuredly they have learned their

lesson, and will not know it any better after a one year suspension .
I also agree that after a one year suspension each grievant
may not be as good a pilot as now, and may need re-training.

But

consideration of such matters are for the Company in deciding the
degree of penalty.

If, as here, discipline is proper, the

arbitrator may not substitute his judgment regarding the extent
of the penalty because of those factors, for the judgment of
the Company, when the penalty decided on by the Company is not
excessive, arbitrary or discriminatory.
Also, discipline is what the word means - a penalty.

A

penalty may be imposed as "punishment" or for rehabilitation, as
a deterrent, or even as an example for others.

So, on those

bases, even if I believed that a lesser penalty would have been
enough to achieve these objectives, I cannot disturb the Company's
right to suspend the grievants for a longer period.

Eric J.Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: May 17, 1988

B °ar d o f Ad u stmen t
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

AWARD
Case No. NY 88-86

Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company's inversal of 767 bid Captains
and First Officers and DC~9 bid First Officers at the St. Louis domicile during the
September 1986 bid period violated the Agreement and the decision of neutral Richard
Block in NY-168-83, D. S. Moir.
The pilots inversed shall be paid at the rate
of time and one-half for the period(s) of
their inversals.

DATED: February 15, 1988
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - -

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
D. H. Brown, Concurring
COUNTY OF
I, D. H. Brown do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED:
STATE OF
M. H. Brenan, Concurring
COUNTY OF
I, D. H. Brenan do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED:
STATE OF
D. Grimm, Dissenting
COUNTY OF
I, D. Grimm to hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

o_

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

W. D. Johnson, Dissenting

TWA- P i 1 q t _SY_s_t em _B qa r d _q£ _Ad j_u s_t in e n t
In the Matter of the Arbitration
betx^een
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No. NY 88 - 86

Air Line Pilots Association
and

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Air Line Pilots Association,
hereinafter referred to as "ALPA" and Trans world Airlines, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," the Undersigned was
selected

as the chairman of a System Board of Adjustment to hear

and decide, together with the ALPA and Company designees to said
Board, the following stipulated issue:
Whether or not the Company's inversal of 767
bid Captains and First Officers and DC~9 bid
First Officers at the St. Louis domicile during the September 1986 bid period violated
Sections 10(b)(7), 9(h)(l), 12(E)(3) and other
related Sections of the Agreement and the decision of neutral referee Richard Block in NY-16883, D.S. Moir.
Hearings were held in New York City on August 25 and 26,
1987 at which time representatives of ALPA and TWA appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Captains D. Grimm and W.

D. Johnson served as the TWA Board members.

Captains D. H. Brown

and M. H. Brenan served as the ALPA Board members.

The Oath of

the Board was waived.
A stenographic record was taken and both sides filed a posthearing brief.

Subsequently, the Board met in executive session.

As the stipulated issue recognizes, critical to a determination of this matter is the Opinion and Award of neutral referee
Richard Block in the Moir case.
relevant contract section(s).

That decision interprets the
It is to that decision and the

-2interpretations therein that this Board is bound.

Indeed, the

Company not only does not challenge that decision or its interpretation herein, but asserts instead that it has complied with
it.
Put another way therefore, the issue is whether the inversals involved in the instant case were due to "unusual circumstances" within the meaning not only of the contract provisions,
but particular within the meaning of the Moir award.

Further-

more as mandated by that decision, the Company has "the obligation to provide justification" for the inversals.

~L deem this as

a burden of proof required of the Company.
The Company argues that its staffing for the September 1986
bid period was "historically reasonable."

It states that the

Moir decision interpreted "unusual circumstances" to mean circumstances that were not "reasonably foreseeable or avoidable."
Those latter arguments suggest that a "test of reasonableness"
is all that need be applied to the Company's reserve pilot staffing for the September 1986 bid.
view.

The Moir decision rejects that

It states:
"Nor is the term unusual circumstances to be
equated with "reasonable necessity." ... the
term reasonable necessity is nowhere contained in these [contract] provisions. It may
well be that due to the existence of unusual
circumstances, it will be reasonably necessary
to inverse, but one may not ignore the clear
impact of Section 10(B)(7) which says that
established scheduling policies - and one may
only read this as including the assumption of
avoidabling inversals - will be maintained except in "unusual circumstances."
In my view, "reasonably foreseeable and avoidable" as used

in the Moir decision, is not the same as staffing on the basis of
"historical reasonableness." The Moir award makes that clear.

It

states that the inquiry is "to whether the facts relevant to the
series of inversals in August 1983 were such as would have been

o

reasonably foreseeable and avoidable" (emphasis added).
Applied to the instant case, it is not enough for the Company
to say that it staffed reserves on an "historically reasonable"
basis.

It has to go further and show that the "unplanned occur-

rences" (i.e. short term absences) were, for the September 1986
period, not reasonably foreseeable and avoidable.
I conclude that the Company has failed to meet that burden
of proof.

The formula it used to staff for the September 1986

bid period to meet the burden imposed on it by Moir, to "avoid
inversals in the normal course of scheduling bid holders," does
not meet the test of Moir.
The Company used, as a measurement and guide for reserve
staffing, the statistics of the two or three prior months.

Based

on the quantity of absences and other unplanned occurrences during that period, it made its staffing plans and schedules for
the September 1986 period.

the record does not adequately support

a reliance on that two or three month period.

With the burden on

the Company to justify the inversals, and to show "unusual circumstances," it has not adequately explained why a longer period was
not more relevant and significant; why the prior two or three
months is the most relevant period; why, for example an entire
year was not used; or why the same period of the prior year(s)
was not also considered.

This is not to say that the prior two

or three months is not the most relevant measuring period, but
rather that the Company has the burden of showing that, and has
not done so to my satisfaction.

Indeed it seems to me that when

inversals are due primarily to short term absences for illness
and Union business (the two circumstances here that the Company
claims were unforeseeably high, causing the need for inversals).
There must be some convincing evidence introduced to rebut a

-4normal and logical view that a longer period of time, with a
broader showing of experience should have been used, including
the same "season" or month of prior years.

The Company has not

provided that requisite evidence in this case.
Under the present record, the arbitrator cannot judge whether
the number of absences during the September 1986 bid period were
in fact "unusually high" or "unforeseeably high."

Also, only by

inference, and not by convincing evidence, can it be presumptively
concluded

that all the absences were of pilots scheduled for duty.

The Company's burden to show a proximate relationship between the
numbers of absences and those scheduled for duty, also falls short
of the convincing standard required.

I note that the Company did

not make the connection in the Moir case either.

Mr. Block wrote:

"However, the evidence... in this case fails to
indicate whether the absences were attributable
to pilots who had in fact been assigned flights
during that time. Accordingly, the Board is unable to determine whether the absences had any
impact at all on scheduling."
At the executive session of the Board, some light was shed
by the Company Board members on both the use of the prior two or
three month period and the connection between absences and scheduling.

But this cannot be used as evidence or for probative

resolution of the issue in dispute.
As for the absences due to Union business, I am frankly
sceptical about the Company's claim that it did not know of any
special Union activity at that time and that the absences for
Union business were therefore unforeseeable and an unusual circumstance.

The parties have a highly professional and sophisticated

labor relations relationship.

And while the Company was not

directly involved in any unusual collective bargaining activity
with ALPA at that time, I think it highly probable that the Company
knew, or should have known of matters going on at that time within
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ALPA which would and did take the time of more pilots than customarily.

Again, pursuant to Moir, it is the Company's burden to

show that "union business" which caused absences, was unforeseeable.

And that those absences interfered with scheduling.

Neither

has been satisfactorily shown.
A further quote from the Moir decision is in point:
"The Company, not the Association has access
to the facts and figures concerning the
scheduling and claimed necessity for the inversal and, in a dispute over the necessity
for such move, it is the Company's obligation
to provide justification by demonstrating that
the underlying circumstances requiring such
action were unusual
(emphasis added.
That the staffing for the period exceeded the contract
minimums is immaterial as is the fact that additional personnel
were added to some pilot categories.

What is needed, with the

burden on the Company, is to staff the reserve force sufficiently
to avoid inversals, except in unusual circumstances.

Mere staff-

ing at or above the contract minimum or an increase in some pilot
categories are not themselves defenses to nor justifications of
inversals.

I believe the Company tried and wanted to staff ade-

quately, but it did not do so to satisfy the requirements of Moir.
In short, I do not find that the bulk of the "unplanned
occurrences," namely absences due to short term illness and Union
business have been adequately demonstrated to have been "unusual
circumstances" within the meaning of the contract and the Moir
decision, to justify the inversals.
It should be obvious that this decision is based on the facts
and circumstances of this case, and is confined therefore to the
inversals for the September 1986 bid period.

Factually, it does

not purport to, nor could it have a precedential effect on any
other case challenging inversals.

Indeed, as I see it, each case

will have to stand and be decided on its own facts and events.
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However in the instant case, considering that the Moir decision ordered a "cease and desist", I deem it proper that some
monetary award be included in the instant Award.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: February 15, 1988
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)38''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
National Association of Broadcast
Employees and Technicians, Local 15

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0266 87

AFL-C10
and
UA-Columbia Cablevision of New Jersey

The stipulated issue is:

V.

Whether the Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by promulgating a lateness and absentee policy and by the manner
by which it has been applied and implemented?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

J

Hearings were held on August 27, October 30, 1987 and May
31, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Union and the Company each filed a post-hearing brief.
The Company unilaterally promulgated and implemented a
lateness and absentee policy, under which lateness and absences
are recorded or can add up to "occurrences or one-half an occurrence" and which fixes quantitative and cumulative permissable
levels for those occurrences.

Beyond those limits, affected em-

ployees are subject to discipline, including, ultimately, discharge .
It is well settled that an employer may unilaterally make,
promulgate and implement work rules including rules related to
lateness and absenteeism as a managerial prerogative, provided
the rules are reasonable, proximately related to the jobs involved, well noticed to the employees affected, and uniformly

and non-discriminatorily applied.
1 find, any contrary "past practice" notwithstanding, that
the Company had and has the managerial right to unilaterally install a lateness and absence policy.

1 am satisfied that it was

adequately noticed to the employees and the Union and that it related properly to the jobs and employment setting covered.

There

is no evidence that its application has been uneven or discriminatory .
1 find however, that in one material respect, it is unreasonable, inconsistent with a provision of the contract, and
hence, in that respect, violative of the contract.
Section 6.3 (Sick Pay) of the contract accords employees
sick leave and sick leave pay in a specified annual quantity.

It

reads:
(a) Each Employee shall be entitled to receive Company-paid Sick Leave at Straight
Time Rates for eight (8) days per calendar
years, cumulative year to year, up to a maximum of fifty (50) days. All employees may
at their option, be paid for the unused portion of their sick leave. This is to be paid
on the last pay day of the year.
But the lateness and sick leave policy records as or toward
an "occurrence" absences due to sickness, from the first day and
for all such days, even if that or those absences are for bonafide illnesses and fall within the sick days allowed and paid for
under Section 6.3.

Those absences are counted towards the cumu-

lative point where discipline may be imposed for "excessive
absenteeism."

In short, the policy penalizes an employee and puts

him at risk for discipline, for his utilization of a negotiated
and express contract benefit.
The contract Management Rights clause (Article XV11)
ifically

spec-

prohibits the Company from exercising its managerial
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rights contrary to the express provisions of the contract.

Articl

XV11 reads:
The Union recognizes that subject only to
the express provisions of this Agreement,
the supervision, management, and control
of the Employer's business and operations
are exclusively the functions of the Employer,
(emphasis added)
Here, this disputed application of the lateness and absenteeism policy is in conflict with Section 6.3 of the contract.

And

because, in my view a contract benefit cannot at the same time or
conversely be treated as a penalty or a material component in a
process that is punative,,

and because the express contract is

preeminent, that part of the lateness policy cannot be sustained.
Of course, this is not to say that the Company may not discipline employees for unexcused absences, for abuses of the sick
leave benefit; or for false claims of illness; or even for chronic
illnesses which, even if beyond the employee's fault or control,
result in excessive absenteeism.

The Company may do these things.

But these well recognized circumstances, under which the Company
may take disciplinary action, are not conditions or limitations on
the recording of "occurrences" by the Company under the present
policy.

Instead, without any showing of or premise that an ab-

sence for alleged illness was falsified, or was part of a

chronic

practice or pattern, or was otherwise an abuse of the sick leave
benefit, such absence for illness is routinely and automatically
recorded and added into the cumulative totals leading to discipline
1 deem that unreasonable and contrary to the contract.
Also, this is not to say that employees are entitled to
"take" the full sick leave benefit, or even a substantial part
thereof, each year, year in and year out.

The contract maximum

is obviously designed to cover unusual and long term illnesses,

-4and is not an unconditional annual entitlement on a continuing
basis.

Therefore, an employer may view with suspicion, and re-

quire medical certification of claimed illnesses which year in
and year out equal or approach the contract maximum.

Any such

situation may result in a proper determination that an employee
is unreliable as a regular employee, and discipline, including
ultimate termination is proper.

But again, that circumstance is

not present in these instant situations where employees who were
absent for a single illness or some illnesses, had those absences
recorded under the present policy, and counted towards an "occurrence" and towards any allowable maximum.

In the instant case,

without any showing of a chronic use of all or most of the sick
leave benefit, each year, for a series of years, the individual
absences were nonetheless recorded and so used by the Company in
a manner adverse or potentially adverse to the employee.

Several

named grievants in this case were or may have been so affected.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company had and has the right to make,
promulgate and implement a lateness and
absentee policy, provided it is reasonable,
job related, well noticed to the affected
employees and evenhandedly administered.
The instant policy is unreasonable insofar as
it includes as or toward an "occurrence,"
absences due to bonafide illnesses which fall
within the sick leave benefits and provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement. Absent a showing of a record of chronic absences,
or false or fraudulent claims of sick benefits,
or other abuses of the sick leave provisions
of the contract, the Company may not treat absences due to sickness that are covered by
the sick pay provisions of the contract as
"absences" for discipline or potential discipline under its lateness and absentee policy.
To that extent, the promulgation, application

-5and implementation of the Company's lateness
and absentee policy is in violation of the
contract.
The Company is directed to change, modify or
amend its policy to comply with this Award.
All employees who have been adversely affected
by the policy shall have their records corrected,
including the expunging therefrom of all record^
ings of absences that this Award prohibits. Their
accumulations of "occurrences" shall be appropriately changed. Any discipline resulting therefrom is
reversed and expunged and said employees shall
otherwise be made whole.
In accordance with the stipulation of the parties,
1 shall retain jurisdiction for the application
and/or interpretation of this AWARD.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 26, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
1, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that 1 am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 87-21015

AFGE, Local 1917
and
U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service

The issue is the propriety of the three day suspension of
Michael A. Perri, Jr.
A hearing was held on June 3, 1988 at the offices of the
Service at which time Mr. Perri, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Service
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was taken

and each side filed a post-hearing brief.
There are two charges against the grievant for which he was
suspended three days.

He is charged with wilful delay in report-

ing to the Pan Am terminal at JFK Airport on reassignment from his
maritime position; and following reporting for that reassignment,
for using "obscene, insulting, and abusive" language to Supervisor
Michael F. Blair.
I have found that the charges have been proved only in part,
and I shall reduce the disciplinary suspension

proportionately.

In discipline cases, the charges must be established by the
employer by clear and convincing evidence.
grievant purposefully

The charge that the

delayed in reporting to the reassignment has

not been so established.

The Service's case on that charge is

speculative and inadequately circumstantial.

It claims that, based

on normal travel time (following an allowed lunch period) the griev
ant should have arrived at Pan Am by 2 PM.

That he did not arrive
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until 3 PM caused the Service to conclude that he was resisting
the reassignment and attempting to minimize his time there.
may be so, but there is no direct evidence to support it.

That
The

grievant was not seen engaging in delaying tactics, and his explanation that traffic and parking difficulties that day were
heavy and difficult, causing the delay, was not refuted by the
requisite quantum of rebuttal evidence.

So, though the Service

had cause to be suspicious, suspicions are not enough to meet the
"clear and convincing"

standard.

It is clear in my mind that the grievant was angry about the
reassignment; was angry about the fact that Blair would not grant
his request that he be released from duty by 4:30 PM; and was angry
that by being retained until 6 PM, he would have difficulty travel-"
ing home, little time for a meal and sleep, before his scheduled
assignment

the next day.

He exhibited his anger and resentment

by what he said to Blair. I accept as accurate, the language attributed to the grievant by the Service, especially since the grievant
neither denied it nor recollected what he said exactly.

Indeed,

he virtually conceded the use of the specific unsocial language.
However, I find that what he said was a reaction to the
circumstances, an intemperate outburst against the position he
found himself in, and an emotional complaint in an excessive form.
Yet, he did not defy the orders of the supervisor; he performed
the duties assigned; and remained at work the full time required.
Moreover, and importantly, as inexcusable as his outburst was, I
do not find that it was directed to or against Blair, nor was it
intended as a vilification of Blair.

It was not intended, nor did

it come out as a personal attack on or an insult to or abuse of
the Supervisor.

Rather it was an intemperate and inappropriate

response to a work situation.

And considering its setting, manner

-3-

and language, was disrespectful to Blair, but not defiant of his
authority or insubordinately personal.
Therefore though the grievant's conduct is not to be excused,
and because had had been previously cautioned about these types of
outbursts, some discipline is justified, and that discipline is
appropriately a suspension.

But, because I do not find it as

aggregious as the Service alleges, and because the AWOL charge
falls short of the requisite proof, I shall reduce the grievant's
three day suspension to a one day

suspension.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The three day suspension of Michael A. Perri,
Jr. is reduced to a one day disciplinary suspension. He shall be made whole for the two
days lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IBT Local 868

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0697 88

and
Whitney Museum of American Art

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Everald Wilson? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on November 29, 1988 at which time Mr.
Wilson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
There is no doubt in my mind that shortly prior to March
25, 1988 the Employer had grounds to discharge the grievant for
his cumulatively unsatisfactory employment record which included
several warnings for poor attendance and "pattern absences on
weekends," and two suspensions for other acts of misconduct.
However on March 25, 1988 and when the instant discharge was effectuated on May 20, 1988, the Employer took steps which prejudiced its right to take discharge action on that latter date.
On March 25, 1988, instead of discharging the grievant for
a continuation of an unsatisfactory attendance record, together
with his other record of discipline, it gave him a "final
warning."
In significant part that "final warning" read:
"Abuse of sick leave policies
1] No call (AWOL) on 3/18/88
2] Excessive sick leave
3] Pattern sick leave
This is a final written warning.
Further
abuse will be cause for dismissal." (emphasis

added)
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Secondly, when the instant discharge was effectuated, it
was not for the grievant's overall disciplinary record, but
rather limited to "continued excessive and patterned absenteeism.'
The Employer asserts that the instant discharge was for the
grievant's overall record, with "emphasis" on his sick leave and
absentee record.

However I reject this position.

the discharge notice states.

It is not what

More significantly, the Employer

conceeds that it gave serious thought to dismissing the grievant
on the grounds of his overall record (including

the two suspen-

sions), and even drafted discharge notices on that basis.
it discarded

But

those expanded dismissal notices, settling instead

for the official notice in this case, citing only "excessive and
patterned absenteeism" as the grounds.

To my mind that means that

the Employer made a conscious and determined decision to base the
discharge solely on the absenteeism charge, and not to rely on
the balance of the grievant's disciplinary record.

Therefore it

is to the "absentee" charge that the Employer is bound

and which

the Employer must prove by evidence that is clear and convincing.
By these two actions

the Employer narrowed the issue to

whether, following the final warning, the grievant continued to
abuse the sick leave program and continued his record of absenteeism at a level and magnitude which properly triggered his
discharge.
I conclude that though not perfect or completely acceptable,
the grievant's record for the short period after the final warning, did not constitute an "abuse" or "continuation" of his sick
leave and absentee practices warranting dismissal.

And, with the

issue so narrowed, the procedure of the grievant's discharge, did
not meet the requisite steps of progressive discipline.

_ O_

Following the "final warning," the grievant took "vacation
days" on April 1, 2, 3 and 10, and his "birthday holiday" on
April 9.

The Employer states that those absences, which the

grievant requested and was granted, were proper, and that he
should not be penalized for them.

On April 19, 21, 22, 23, 24,

the grievant was on suspension for another offense, and it is
similarly stipulated that those days cannot be held against him
in this proceeding.

On May 1 he had another proper vacation day.

The grievant's offenses, following the final warning, are
limited to May 8, 14 and 15.

On the 8th he was late to work

about 10 minutes because of a "late subway."

On May 14, at the

end of his shift on the day before, the grievant asked for and was
granted a "vacation" day.

It turned out subsequently, that he

had earned only a one-half day vacation at that point, so he was
granted % the 14th on vacation, and docked % a day's pay for % of
that day as an absence.

On the 15th the grievant called in ill,

and was docked for that day, as he had previously exhausted his
sick leave benefit.
So, his errors, following the final warning, were for his
lateness on May 8th, a % day absence on May 14th and a day's
absence on May 16th.
Though there is doubt in my mind that those absences and
lateness rise fully to the level of "further abuse" within the
meaning of the "final warning,

I need not determine that defin-

itively at this point because of a procedural defect in the
Employer's disciplinary action.

Limited to his absentee record,

including sick leave abuses and patterned absences, the grievant
had been only warned previously.

At no point was he suspended

for that record. (His two suspensions were for other reasons and
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as previously ruled, are not part of or relevant to this case.)
Universally well settled is the principle that for poor
attendance of all types, the procedure of progressive discipline
is mandated.

And that warnings must be followed by a suspension,

to impress on the employee the seriousness of his unsatisfactory
record, before discharge can be imposed for a
that record.

continuation of

Here, assuming that his record following the final

warning was still unsatisfactory, a suspension, not a discharge
would have been the proper penalty.
I conclude in this case that a suspension is the proper
penalty.

The grievant was on final warning

and he knew it.

As

such, he had a special duty to avoid absenteeism, use of sick
leave and lateness.

While he may not be held to being an "abso-

lute guarantor" of perfect attendance, he can and should be held
to circumstances

he could or should have controlled.

meet that standard of duty in this case.

He did not

Under final warning, an

employee must act prudently to avoid latenesses, even if it means
traveling to work earlier than usual.

The grievant's lateness

on May 8th showed his failure to act prudently and to guard against
the possibility of lateness.

More serious are the circumstances

of May 14 and 15 (a Saturday and Sunday).

I don't accept the

grievant's statement that he didn't know that he didn't have a
full days vacation entitlement accumulated at that time. I think
he knew, or at least should have known, and should not have asked
for a vacation day, on very short notice, when it was administratively difficult for the Employer to check his eligibility.
The burden was his, not the Employer's at that point, to seek a
vacation day only if he had the entitlement.

That % day loss of

pay that day as a % day absence, is evidence of his failure to
meet the duty imposed on him by the final warning.

The same is

_ r_

true, and perhaps more so, by his absence "«on May 15th.
fied that he had a cut lip and couldn't talk.
that that should have kept him out of work.

He testi-

I am not persuaded
He admitted that the

bleeding had stopped after the accident the day before, and the
wound did not require stitches.

That he had trouble talking and/or

that the injury caused pain is not enough to justify taking the day
off, when his sick leave had been exhausted and when he was under
a "final warning."

That I also view as a default on his duty to

exercise extra care with regard to his attendance record.
For these reasons, though the penalty of discharge is premature,
a disciplinary suspension is proper.

And I conclude that the

period of the suspension should be for the time that he has been
out.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Everald Wilson is reduced to
a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated, but without back pay, and the period
of time from his discharge to his reinstatement
shall be deemed the disciplinary suspension.

DATED: December 15, 1988
STATE OF NEW YORK)
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)83''

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0412 87

and
WU World Communications, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be
20-51, 23-07,
21-05, 21-06,
20-75, 23-00,
p- yj

the disposition of grievances
20-77, 20-96, 20-97, 21-01,
20-72, 22-70, 21-95, 20-78,
20-60, 20-98, 20-89, 20~92?

The above number grievances all involve claims by the Union
that supervisory employees performed bargaining unit work in violation of Article XIV Section 5(a) and (b) of the collective bargaining agreement.
A hearing was held on February 22, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
was waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath

Each side filed a post-hearing brief.

The Company asserts that this matter was determined and
therefore is controlled by a prior Award by Arbitrator George
Moskowitz.

In that Award, rendered in 1986, Mr. Moskowitz held

that Article XIV would not be violated if supervisory employees
performed bargaining unit work for no more than four hours a shift
In the instant case, the Company concedes that supervisors regularly performed the

"bargaining unit work involved, but not in

excess of four hours a shift.
The Union contends that the Moskowitz Award is not controlling because it was rendered during a period of full employment;
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whereas in the instant case, a number of unit employees were laid
off; that Mr. Moskowitz considered the then ratio of supervisors
to bargaining unit employees in reaching his four hour formula,
and that because of an instant change in that ratio due to bargaining unit layoffs, the Moskowitz formula is no longer applicable
In both the Moskowitz case and the instant matter before me,
the bargaining unit work involved is in the Telex Department, and
concerns various methods and means of handling messages for customers.

In both cases the Time-Iran system was and is used, and

in the case before me the Union's specific complaints relate to
supervisors performing the duties of "repair of live traffic" and
"mailbox."

So, I find that the Moskowitz decision dealt essential-

ly with the same type of bargaining unit work as is involved in
the grievances before me.
It is well settled that a subsequent arbitrator should not
overturn the decision of a prior arbitrator where the two cases
involve the same contract interpretation, unless the subsequent
arbitrator finds the prior decision to be palpably wrong.

The

threshold question here is whether the Moskowitz decision dealt
with the same contract interpretation issue as is presently before
me.

The answer is yes, unless the Moskowitz decision regarding

the meaning and application of Article XIV is limited to critical
factual circumstances then present, and now absent.

The different

fact relied on by the Union is the contention that Mr. Moskowitz
based his four hours per shift formula on a specific supervisoryunit employee ratio.
I do not read the Moskowitz decision to require any specific
supervisor-unit employee ratio.

Mr. Moskowitz found that the work

of "four supervisory employees overseeing the work of sixteen bargaining unit employees" was "in violation of Article XIV Section 5
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when such bargaining unit work is performed by a supervisor in
excess of four (4) hours per shift." (emphasis added)

I interpret

that to mean that Mr. Moskowitz was limiting supervisory employees
to the four hours, not necessarily to a ratio of four supervisors
to sixteen bargaining unit employees.

Put another way, he made

factual reference to an existing example (i.e. four supervisors
overseeing sixteen unit employees), and found that supervisors
working on bargaining unit duties for more than four hours prejudiced the units overtime opportunities.

In my view he would have

sustained their performance of bargaining unit work if it was for
or less than four hours regardless of the number of bargaining
unit employees they supervised.
For had Mr. Moskowitz intended that a particular ratio of
supervisor~to unit employee be present as a

condition precedent

to permitting a supervisor to perform up to four hours of bargaining unit work per shift, he would have specifically built that into his formula.

Instead he stated that

"the function of the Award should be to outline
the parameters of contractually intended and
permitted areas of supervisory performance and
responsibility as agreed."
and that
"the function of the Award should not cast any
doubt on or weaken these functions of the supervisor at the "command position" which functions
are designed or reasonably expected to be performed, to assess the smooth flow of traffic,
message backlog, operational delay in transmission,
or to make managerial decisions concerning resolution of problems. These supervisory functions
include the monitoring and control of the system
for the end purpose of service to the customer."
And in his actual Award he stated:
"I shall therefore award that bargaining unit
work in excess of four (4) hours per shift
per supervisor cease."
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He made no reference to, nor did he found it on any supervisorunit employee ratio.

What Mr. Moskowitz meant, I conclude, is

that Article XIV contemplates supervisors performing some quantity
of bargaining unit work because of the nature of the business and
their responsibilities to the services rendered customers, and
that if it was limited to no more than the four hours per shift
per supervisor, that needed responsibility would be met, the
quantitative allowance under Article XIV satisfied, and, as a
reasonable balance, would not deprive an employee of overtime
earnings or cause a layoff within the meaning of Article XIV.
did Mr. Moskowitz

Nor

condition his formula on the requirement that

there be full employment among all unit employees.
Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied that it was not
Mr. Moskowitz's intention to structure a particular supervisorybargaining unit ratio as a condition to
bargaining unit work.

supervisory activity on

Rather, the limit he intended and ruled was

was solely the four hour limitation.
Indeed, if such a ratio is to be considered, so too, in my
view, must the quantity of available work at any time both supervisors and unit personnel perform that work, with additional consideration of the percentage handled by supervisors compared with
the percentage handled by unit employees.

Those were not part of

Mr. Moskowitz's considerations and would be important if questions
of deprivation of overtime or layoff causation had to be decided.
Under the circumstance where supervisors were performing an unreasonable quantity of bargaining unit work, when unit employees
were on layoff, the Moskowitz formula might not be applicable or
fair.

But the requisite evidence for my consideration of those

circumstances was not developed or presented adequately in this
case.
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With that interpretation

of Article XIV, under which Mr.

Moskowitz balanced the right of supervisors to perform some bargaining unit work as part of their responsibilities, with the
protection due unit employees from loss of overtime opportunities
or from layoff, other limitations are not sustainable based on the
record in this case.
Accordingly,

I find that Mr. Moskowitz's decision is relevant

and applicable to the instant case before me, and I do not find
the Moskowitz decision to be a "palpably wrong" interpretation of
Article XIV of the contract.

Therefore I conclude that I am bound

by it; that it stands as a valid and enforceable interpretation of
Article XIV and as the current contractual rule regarding the
amount of bargaining unit work which can be performed by a supervisor without violating employee rights under Article XIV.
Remaining therefore is the question of whether the supervisors in the case before me, have been exceeding the four hour
per shift limitation.

The burden of proof is on the Union and

that burden has not been met by the requisite quantity and quality
of probative evidence.

The Union's case in this regard is based

on "observations" made by certain bargaining unit employees.

But

those observations unsupported by time and work records, are too
imprecise and inconclusive to prove the Union's claim that the
supervisors have been doing bargaining unit work for six or more
hours per supervisor per shift.

The Union witnesses could not

document the amount of time precisely or even with reasonable
accuracy, nor could they show conclusively the nature of the work
done over the period involved.

It is not illogical or unreason-

able to conclude that within the six or more hours alleged by the
Union, the supervisors were doing supervisory work at the "command
positions" which Mr. Moskowitz said must not be weakened.

In the

-6-

face of the Company's denial of supervisory activities in excess
of four hours per shift, and its evidence on the nature of the
work the supervisors have been doing, I cannot find that the
Union's contention has been proved clearly or convincingly.
Though the evidence on overtime potential and a nexus between
supervisors working and layoffs is inconclusive in this record,
my finding that the Moskowitz decision is controlling, makes the
findings of fact on those questions unnecessary in this case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievances set forth in the above
stipulated issue, all relating to the performance of bargaining unit work by supervisory
employees, are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 31, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °'"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

